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Abstract—Hardware and software have failed to securely man-
age the sensitive elements of cryptographic algorithms in
computational environment due to memory contentions. This
opened new opportunities for hackers to carry out side channel
attacks on a system and steal sensitive data. Existing Side-
channel attack techniques show that attackers can exploit the
microarchitecture and OS vulnerabilities. The recent Meltdown
[1] attack for instance, using Flush+Reload technique, exploits
program execution attributes such as “out-of-order execution”
to break the logical isolation between the memories and pro-
cesses. In this paper, we have developed a real-time detection
and identification system against side-channel attacks. Unlike
previous works, the proposed approach does not rely on
synchronisation between the attackers and victims. This is
realised by taking a course of program phase analysis, through
performance counters, to extract Malicious Loop (ML). Simu-
lation has shown that the proposed approach attained higher
accuracy for up to 99% and efficient detection of Flush+Reload
activities, through classification methods. Furthermore, the
detection process, in native and cloud systems, unlike others,
takes shorter execution time without additional costs, and
the model benefits from very low overhead performance of
approximately less than 1% of the host system.
1. Introduction
Nowadays Internet and Cloud computing are increas-
ingly in use on various devices ranging from smart devices
to computer servers. Data protection becomes a great chal-
lenging factor. Although crypto-algorithms have emerged as
promising approaches to protect data, hardware and software
vulnerabilities attract hackers to target cryptographic com-
ponents and steal their secret elements by achieving the side
channel attack. The side channel attack is the action of steal-
ing sensitive information by exploiting hardware/software
vulnerabilities to provide unauthorised communication chan-
nels across independent entities in shared systems. The main
attack characteristics can be identified firstly by relying
on hardware contentions - cache misses to observe victim’
activities, secondly by performing operations on the system
without privileges, and finally by monitoring the processors’
cycles [2] and the power consumption [3] as metrics to
measure latency.
Various techniques have been employed in the literature
to achieve side channel attacks, such as Flush+Reload [4],
Prime+Prob [5], Flush+Flush [6] and Evict+Reload [7].
In this paper, we focus on Flush+Reload attacks. These
schemes allow attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities at
micro-architecture level by installing hidden communication
channels through memory levels between the victim and
attacker programs. One of the most common vulnerabilities
is the hardware contention, which occurs in real-time during
data access across multiple independent programs. Hardware
contentions are series of threats operating on the sensitive
data and thus reducing the degree of memory isolation
in real-time across concurrent programs. The exploitation
of hardware contentions has been practised at all memory
layers including L1I [8], L1D [9], L2 [10], LLC [4] and
main memory [11]. The attackers have also practised the
aforementioned techniques against various cryptographic al-
gorithms AES [2], DES [12], RSA [4], [13]. Recent studies
showed the successful attacks occurred in security settings -
hardware settings [14] and disabling OS features like page
sharing [15] and KASLR [16], securing software implemen-
tations constant programming [17], hardware implementa-
tion for sensitive data SGX [18], and compiler optimisation
[19].
However, past research shows that many detection and
mitigation solutions have been proposed to eliminate such
attacks, such as detection system [20] [21] [22] and pro-
tection [23] [24] [25]. However, the attackers continuously
explore new vulnerabilities [1] [26]. The exploitation has
reached a level where the data protection in kernel space
across user programs has been compromised to side channel
attacks. The most recent attack is Meltdown [1] in which
the attacker uses the Flush+Reload technique to exploit
the execution mechanism ”Out-of-order execution” to reveal
logical memory isolation of the sensitive data in kernel
space.
The above problems indicate that it is crucial to develop
a detection technique to efficiently mitigate side-channel
attacks from stealing sensitive data. In this paper, a new
knowledge-based framework is proposed which can leverage
hardware features to analyse process activities at a low
level (processor core) with the aim of detecting malicious
processes which may lead to achieving side-channel attacks
in the user space. The framework is capable of eliminating
security threats against cache memories, which accommo-
date the cryptography algorithms. The proposed framework
uses a new profiling technique which observes processor
core level activities. This profiling allows the use of machine
learning algorithms to build a classification model, which
does not require any synchronisation between the victim
and attacker programs to detect side channel attacks in
the system. To the best of our knowledge, most of the
detection systems rely on synchronisation to analyse data
dependency in to detect the attacker. Nonetheless, there
are a number of factors having a negative impact on the
synchronisation approach, such as heavy workloads leverage
[27] and program execution instability [21]. Particularly in
cloud systems, the synchronisation approach requires more
investigation to recognise the attack pattern [28]. Whereas,
in the proposed framework, detecting the attack in both
native and cloud systems have the same cost.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section
2 presents a brief review of the related work. In section
3, the general layout of the framework is presented. Sec-
tion 4 elaborates the proposed detection and identification
methods of the proposed framework (TrapMP). Section 5
demonstrates the simulation results with detailed analysis.
Finally, a summery of the work is given in section 6.
2. Related Works
Side channel attack detection have been researched for
about two decades. Various techniques have been used to
detect, protect and prevention in various levels. Thus, this
work discusses the review of recent work to reveal the most
up-to-date best practice in side channel attack detection, and
addresses limitations in previous work on the subject.
Profiling: Zhang et al. [29] and Payer [20] proposed
the use of the perf tool against side channel attacks by
monitoring existing processes in the system. [29] selected
VMs at random to monitor, while [20] monitored all pro-
cesses in the system. The fact remains that side channel
attackers can escape observation because the use of perf
in both studies depends on the file system proc to retrieve
information about the system’s existing processes. A case
study on Malware attacks [30] demonstrated the feasibility
of an attacker modifying the proc file to hide its process id
from the system so then perf gained no information about
the malicious processes. In this paper, on the other hand, we
have proposed a system profiling mechanism that targets the
processor cores instead of the proc file system, so then all
program execution transactions appear on the observation.
This means that the attackers cannot escape observation.
Native and Cloud systems: Alam et al. [31] and Chi-
appetta et al. [32] proposed detection systems using the
machine learning approach to detect side channel attack in
native systems. However, they failed to detect malicious
VMs in cloud systems. Our work proposes a detection
mechanism of ML in both native and cloud systems without
an additional cost concerning the cloud systems.
Synchronisation: When the side channel attack uses
hardware resources such as CPU cache memory, it basically
relies on memory contentions in the repetition manner which
leads to unintentional contentions. The attackers are unaware
of this, and this causes significant abnormal activities. This
can be easily detected by utilising a synchronisation ap-
proach. This means that the attack processes can be detected
by relying on the data collected by the victim [22]. This
approach is vulnerable in two potential circumstances. First,
Allaf el at. [27] studied a comparison of multiple machine
learning algorithms, namely age is SPEC cpu2006 int and
fp application, in order to stress the CPU cache memory.
As a result of this, heavy workloads have a negative impact
on the detection accuracy of three machine learning algo-
rithms including DT, PCAANN and KNN. All algorithms
performed well when no workload was running, with int
applications such as gcc and bzips degrading the accuracy.
With fp, the accuracy got worse.
Performance: The performance overhead is the central
issue affecting system performance in reference to any
potential detection methods. System overheads need to be
considered, and can be classified as either an OS-based
overhead or an application-based overhead. An OS overhead
is much more expensive than an application overhead. [33]
recommends injecting a machine learning algorithm into
OS scheduling to monitor CPU component usage to detect
malicious processes. Cloudradar [29] employs and dedicates
three processor cores to monitor malicious processes. Payer
[20] continuously monitors all existing processes. These
mechanisms incur overheads in the host system. In the
proposed framework, instead of injecting machine learning
algorithms at the OS level, the detection system is placed in
the user space and only data collection is placed in the kernel
space. The proposed framework does not monitor the whole
processes in the system, and it instead profiles the processor
core executions. Finally, the proposed framework does not
require dedicated hardware and OS configurations.
3. Background
3.1. Real-time Scheduling
Scheduling is one of the core OS services to support and
mange hardware resources across running programs. The
main goal of scheduler is to minimise power consumption
[34], which is used by the resources, and offer the optimal
performance by minimise stalls [35] to provide the optimal
dynamic adoption Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling
(DVFS)1 [36]. Thus, OS designers and researchers intend
to propose optimal scheduling algorithms to aid bottlenecks
and reduce power consumption in order to utilise highest
possible speed that a CPU has with considering hardware
limitations. The main focus in scheduling studies is the
1. is the adjustment process of power and speed settings on various
processors in computing device
usage of underlying hardware resources efficiently and how
to virtualise and share them across processes. On the other
hand, side channel attacks come into account to distort
the beauty of scheduler by misusing the shared resources
due to scheduler vulnerabilities while using them [1], [26];
and become an obstacle in front of them to scale up CPU
components as CPU speed.
3.2. Program Phase Utilisation
Program phase has been utilised in various computa-
tional problems related to performance, such as saving en-
ergy [34] and performance tuning [35]. Recent studies have
found that the use of program phase leverages CPU scaling,
which relies on the correlation between memory and CPU
workloads. Program phase provides information to improve
scheduler algorithms in the OS. For instance, Skrenes et al.
[37] employed the Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
(DVFS) mechanism, which balances high speed CPU with
memory access latency to avoid stalls when the workload
intends to fetch data from the cache memory. Furthermore,
Zhang et al. [34] used dynamic configuration CPU frequency
to save CPU power. This guides the system to switch the
CPU frequency mode into a higher frequency rate when
intensive CPU usage is indicated and vice versa. In addition,
the program phase has been utilised in performance simu-
lation tools to reduce the simulation time for benchmarks.
3.3. Program Phase Definition
In the computational environment, the total computation
of any program can be divided into a set of intervals. Each
interval is a slice of the program’s execution. A set of
intervals is composed to form a phase. The phase can occur
multiple times within the program’s execution. The transac-
tions between two consecutive phases is called phase change
[35]. Program execution behaviours vary from program to
program including large-scale ones [38]. Thus, Dhodapkar
et al. [39] categorised program phases into stable phase
and phase changes. Stable phases are indicated if two or
more phases have exactly similar activities, otherwise phase
changes are indicated. The presence of phase changes indi-
cates that the phase has been incurred with computational
noise. Furthermore, phase detection relies on the nature of
a program. The program may be a memory transactions or
instruction stream [35], [40]. In addition, in some circum-
stances, it is hard to distinguish phase transition; however,
selecting relevant events has a positive impact on phase
detection by signalling the transactions between phases [40].
3.4. Malicious Loop Phase Modelling
Recall that the main part of a FLUSH+RELOAD attack
program body is a malicious loop (ML), which steals secret
key in AES; inside the ML, the two consecutive tasks are
executed, flush a targeted memory addresses, which are the
range of the memory addresses in which the AES look-up
table is stored, using clflush instruction and are followed
by access to the flushed address continuously. Thus, in the
ML structure, each phase has a set of intervals of similar
execution activities. The activities are the consumption of
the hardware resources such as the L1, L2 and LLC caches.
Any clflush instruction causes an equal number of cache
misses at each hierarchical cache level, when the next ac-
cess is achieved. As L1 and L2 are private per core, high
frequency context switches have more influences on L1 and
L2 misses than LLC. This leads to the visualisation of ML
phases by noting that LLC cache misses have clear phase
transactions between two adjacent phases. Figure 1 depicts
the complete program phase of Flush+Reload from start to
end in user space by capturing E1 and E2; and in this
case the Flush+Reload program runs for a short period of
time for the presentation purpose. However, when utilising
Flush+Reload in real systems, the loop boundary is much
longer in order to retrieve the entire key bits (as described
by [15]). Figure 1 - (a) represents E1 cache misses in a
more organised way than for Figure 1 - (b) which is E2.
However, the phases of a program are decomposed into
sub-phases in execution-time. Recall that each task of the
program is fragmented into jobs, represented in sub-phases,
and shuffled with jobs of other programs, so that the jobs are
queued by scheduler for execution; and the task scheduler
fairly distributes them across online processor cores. Each
of such sub-phases appears in between other sub-phases of
other workloads in user space. Figure 6 shows the sub-
phases of the Flush+Reload program which are distributed
across other sub-phases of other programs in the same
processor core’s execution timeline. The sub-phases of the
ML can be recognised across sub-phases of other programs,
but the points that indicate the phase transition are hard to
capture. HPCs can virtualise sub-phase transactions between
two different sub-phases of two independent programs by
relying on the ML behaviour based on their execution
attributes. This transaction can be used to extract the ML
activities across existing workloads in the computational
environment. However, defining sub-phases is not an easy
task in heterogeneous workload due to changes in program
behaviours during run time which are leveraged by dynamic
hardware adoption and configuration, but selecting the most
relevant and efficient event to characterise ML leads to
distinct ML sub-phases across other workloads.
3.5. Threat Model and Assumptions
This section illustrates the potential Flush+Reload attack
on microprocessor caches. The attacker exploits hardware
and OS vulnerabilities by utilising intentional hardware con-
tentions with a victim’s processes, while both the attacker
and victim are synchronised, in shared environments in
which hardware resources, such as CPU caches, are fairly
shared across running applications in both native and cloud
systems. The attacker and victim use an AES algorithm to
encrypt plain text. An AES algorithm is implemented in
crypto.so, which is a shared library in an OpenSSL
package and it is installed in the host OS Ubuntu 14.04.
Figure 1. Signature of the attacker program in the native system shows
the behaviour of the Flush+Reload program and how it interacts with
underlying hardware during its execution
Figure 2. Signature of the attacker program in the native system shows the
behaviour of the Flush+Reload program and how it interacts with under-
lying hardware during its execution and transparently provides interfaces
to access HPCs. It is assumed that no malicious bodies have access to the
PHCs to modify settings and distort the observations.
The attackers can be a malicious program in the host OS
or VM in the guest OS. The attacker analyses the hardware
cache contentions to deduce the AES secret keys.
4. TrapMP
TrapMP is a trapping method for capturing Malicious
Processes (MP) at the processor core level. The TrapMP
is composed of two parts: the detection and identification
phases. Both phases rely on the usage of HPCs to support
their models in detection and identification tasks. The de-
tection model is responsible for detecting ML activities in
the system, whereas the identification model is responsible
for identifying the owner of the ML program. They request
information from the kernel module about the state of pro-
cessor cores, because both the detection and identification
models run in user space; and programs in user space have
no access to HPCs. Figure 3 illustrates the high level of
the framework and shows its main components, along with
their hardware usages and their communications. The yellow
notations represent the whole process in chronological order.
Detection Phase: In this phase, the detection model
is responsible for detecting side channel attacks, namely
Flush+Reload in the system. The model utilises supervised
machine learning algorithms to classify the attack activi-
ties which are achieved by the attacker program in user
space. The detection model continuously observes program
execution attributes on active processor cores from any
ML activities. 1 The Detection Agent (DA) sets up the
communication channels with the Event Recorder Agent
Figure 3. An overview of the proposed framework (TrapMP)
(ERA) in kernel space to request S samples per processor
core. 2 Then DA performs prepossessing of raw data by
applying shift and aggregation mean function to combine n
of consequent samples to capture ML sub-phases. 3 The
DA feeds the new data-sets to the classifier to extract the
attacks pattern. 4 The classifier sends back the results to
the DA. 5 The DA sends an alert to the identification phase
if attack activities have been detected.
Identification Phase: is responsible to identify the at-
tackers by setting up a trap routine to redirect the malicious
program execution path to an interrupt routine. In the cloud
settings, the framework is capable of trapping the malicious
VMs and identifying them as having the same cost as
the native system. 6 The Process Identifier Agent (PIA)
requests the Core Inspector Agent (CIA) to inspect any
program execution attributes related to the ML execution
attributes. This is done by settings and initialising HPC
counters to investigate the state of each processor core. 7
If the values of the PMC counters match the attack patterns,
which relies on the statistical analysis model, then the CIA
will trigger an interrupt to suspend the MP and yield the
necessary information about the MP. 8 The CIA reports
back details about the identification of the ML to the PIA,
Finally, the PIA reports back on the identity of the malicious
processes or VMs to the admin users.
4.1. Experiment Setup
The experiments were achieved on a HP Proliant DL360
G7 with Intel Xeon X5650 2.66GHz processor and 16 GB
of RAM. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04. Further-
more, SPEC cpu2006 benchmark has been used for testing
purposes.
4.2. Feature Selection
In this study, feature selection plays the key role in
detecting side channel attack by profiling processor cores in
Real Time Systems (RTS), in which program execution at-
tributes are captured during their assignment to the processor
cores, because no information is provided about processes
which are assigned to the processor cores such as PID.
Proper features, which represent the execution attributes,
supports classification algorithms to extract Flush+Reload
attack activities with high accuracy. Thus, it is crucial to
select features which makes the distinction between attack
program and other workload in the system. Unlike previous
work [20], [21], [29] in which the feature selection relies on
the facts that relevant to the synchronisation between victim
and attacker programs, in which features are selected based
on the data dependency which indicates the co-relation
between victim and attacker programs. Whilst, feature selec-
tion in this paper does not rely on synchronisation and data
dependencies, instead it focuses the unintentional memory
contentions by the attacker program. Table 4.2 presents the
relevant cache misses to Flush+Reload attack.
PMCs Anno. Events
Programmable
E1 LLC Misses
E2 L2 RQSTS.ALL CODE RD
E3 L2 RQSTS.DEMAND DATA RD HIT
E4 L2 RQSTS.ALL DEMAND DATA RD
TABLE 1. RELEVANT EVENTS TO SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK
4.3. Moving Window Aggregation (MWA)
The aggregation mean function is employed to find
the related samples which belong to a single job in ML.
As a scheduler cannot be controlled in terms of assigning
jobs to the online processor cores and the duration of the
assignments, the default is to guess how many samples
belong to a job and for how long a processor core holds the
job. Consequently, giving raw data to the machine learning
algorithms will negatively impact on the performance of
the classifiers in detecting side channel attacks [41]. Thus,
we leveraged the MWA algorithm. To construct the phases
of the ML by finding the set of consequent samples in
execution time, which belong to the ML jobs.
MWA is the process of partitioning the data-set D which
has N samples with F features into subsets D¯. Each subset
contains the consequent n samples, when n ⊆ N , and F
features; and averages them to produce one sample which
represents one ML phase. As a result, a new data-set D¯i
will be generated with the length of
n
N
samples. This is
to transform each the ML phases n into one sample and
this will be classified as attack activities. Still it is not
guaranteed that the whole body of the phase will be cap-
tured, because there might be a sample from the neighbour
jobs of other workloads which will interfere with the ML
phases. To overcome this problem, the original data-set will
be shifted n times and the same procedure split and the
mean function for each subset will be repeated to generate
n of D¯ = {D¯1, D¯2, .., D¯n}, where n is also the threshold
which indicates less than the maximum length of the ML
samples which might appear in each ML phase in real-
time. The whole data-set will be given to the classifier to
allow more chance to detect any potential ML activities.
The MWA algorithm provides reliability and robustness in
the detection system, because it tries to extract and capture
each ML phase by combining the chronological sequence
of samples which belong to each ML job in execution-time.
4.4. Methodology
Bagging (short for Bootstrap aggregating) was intro-
duced by Breiman [42] is an ensemble learning technique
to decrease the variance of a predictor by bootstrapping
samples with replacements from the original data-set to
train prediction models of any supervised machine learning
algorithms and aggregating their results to select the best
predictor. Random forest is the implementation of bagging
technique [42] to construct a collection of Decision Trees.
Breiman [43], for the first time, introduced Random forest
to decrease variance, which is generated by a single tree-
based predictor CART, by constructing many internal tree
predictors in the forest each of which is trained on an
independent random sample derived from the original data-
set with replacements. Furthermore, each random sample
is composed of random features to increase the chance
of contributing the maximum number of features in the
splitting processes, which is called diversity. Random forest
has many applications for balanced and imbalanced data-
sets. It has received a lot of attention from researchers
in imbalanced data-sets because Random forest encourages
diversity [44].
4.5. Model Evaluations
After building the Random forest classifiers, we need
to make sure that the models are efficiently applied in the
unseen data-set. The evaluation metrics for classification
models rely on confusion matrix, which contains informa-
tion about the predicted classes produced by the classifier
models and the actual classes from the original data-sets.
When True Positive (TP) is the case where the classifier
correctly recognises the positive samples in the data-set.
False Positive (FP) in this case, the classifier miss-classifies
the positive classes as negative. True Negative (TN) repre-
sents the total number of the negative classes detected by the
classifier correctly. False Negative (FN) when the classifier
miss-classifies the Negative samples as Positive. Based on
the confusion matrix, we can derive the following metrics,
which are used to analyse the performance of the Random
forest classifiers.
1) Recall/Sensitivity (True positive Rate) corre-
sponds to the TP samples which are correctly clas-
sified as positive.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(1)
2) Specificity (False Positive Rate) corresponds to
the FN samples which are incorrectly classified as
positive.
Specificity =
FP
FP + TN
(2)
4.6. Experimental Design
The design of the experiments of this paper can be
summarised in to tow phases. In the first phase, for each of
the two imbalanced data-sets, which are collected in both
native and cloud systems, 20 different runs of ten-fold cross
validation (CV) were executed. In CV, each new data-set is
constructed from different data points in the original data-
sets for both training and testing data-sets so that all data
points contribute in the learners’ building stage. For each
iteration of CV, %70 of the original data-sets were used
for training data-sets and the rest were for testing data-
sets. In the second phase, bagging algorithm random forest
algorithm has been used. With each CV iteration, the new
training data-set is fed to each algorithm to build a classifier
and then the new testing data-set is used to evaluate the
classifier.
4.7. Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, the results of the experiments are shown
for Random forest algorithms and they are visualised by util-
ising (ROC) Area Under curve (AUC) ROC-AUC. Figures
4 and 5 depict the classifiers performance in discriminating
between two process activities which are normal and attack.
In ROC-AUC figures, the classifiers outputs is repre-
sented as ROC curves, which represent the sensitivity (re-
call) and specificity calculations at incremental thresholds
between zero and one across 10 folds when the same data-
set is randomly shuffled, resulting in each fold having a
different spread of the data. The Y axis plots the classifier
output’s True Positives Rates (recall) and the X axis plots
False Positive Rates (specificity). Each fold is an individual
ROC and is the light blue line. It represents detection
quality. The solid blue line is the calculated mean. The ideal
representation is when the ROC curves has x=0 and y=1.
This indicate that the classifiers 100% classify normal and
attack classes in unseen samples.
Figures 4 and 5 show the ROC metric that evaluates
the random-forest classifier’s ability to detect the ML activ-
ities among normal workloads in the host system in both
native and cloud settings respectively. Success in observing
program execution attributes and classifying processes as
normal or attack as a measure of the risk of existing side
channel attack in the system is shown as estimated by the
AUC of ROC. The model identifies ML in a native system
with very high accuracy (AUC=0.99 for an average of 10
folds, with a zero confidence interval), as it is shown in
Figure 4. In the cloud, however, the same algorithm, when
trained on a data-set that captured VM activities, was less
accurate at predicting malicious activities from among other
workloads (AUC=0.99, confidence interval=0.01), as shown
in Figure 5. The classifier therefore has the same efficiency
at identifying malicious loop activities in native and cloud
systems. The noise incurred by L1 and L2 cache memories,
which arises from the additional translation layer imposed
by Structure as a Service (SaaS). Random forest utilises a
bootstrapping technique 4.4 in which all data points in the
Figure 4. ROC-AUC for bagging algorithm (random forest) in native system
Figure 5. ROC-AUC for bagging algorithm (random forest) in cloud system
data-set are involved in model building, particularly in the
imbalanced data-set. Randomforest tries to generate implicit
balanced data-sets by bootstrapping the original data-sets;
in each data-set, the minor class (attack class) is always
placed first, followed by the major class for both training
and testing sets, in which case the model is well-trained
on the training and testing sets to eliminate under-fitting
problems.
4.8. Performance
This section reports on the performance overhead which
is generated by the detection model. In this experiment, the
SPEC CPU2006 benchmark was running for about 13 hours
with and without the detection model. The detection model
was running in user space and continuously communicating
with the Event Record Agent (ERA) to collect data and
feed the detection model for malicious activities.The results
suggest that the detection model has a very low impact on
the performance of the host system; even in the worst case,
the performance overhead is within 0.03.
5. Identification Phase
This section describes the process of identification mali-
cious processes in host OS. This phase responsible in iden-
tifying the malicious processes which initiate the malicious
loop inside side channel attack program.
5.1. Identification Model
Figure 3 depicts the whole process of detection and
identification. From step 5 , the Process Identifier Agent
(PIA) is the entry point for identification. Let’s assume
that the identification model has received a message from
the detection model. PIA acknowledges the Core Inspec-
tor Agent (CIA) to initialise the Trapping procedure. The
CIA is a kernel module which is driver-based and where
the trapping procedure listens to an incoming message
from the PIA. The CIA starts to configure PMCs and
initialises parameters including the thresholds. As it re-
ceives the message, the trapping procedure initialises a
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) to examine the online
processor cores. This function returns a cpu parameter used
by the function msr to confirm that the function reads and it
is then pinned to the specific processor core. This is done be-
cause, without using wrmsr_safe_on_cpu(unsigned
int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 l, u32 h), there is
no guarantee merely from using rdmsr and wrmsr in-
structions that the targeted processor core will be read. The
CIA then examines each processor core individually to find
the core serving the attack program.
A vector of PMC variable vPMC[pc] is created, when
pc = the number of PMC, to store PMC counter values. In
the inner loop of the identification algorithm 1, in the first
iteration, the values of PMCs are stored into vMPC0. In
the other iterations, the new captured PMC is averaged with
the vPMC content. Until the counter reaches the length
of the phase. The phase variable indicates the minimum
length of samples which might occur within one job. If,
say, the number of samples is five then the loop inside
the identification procedure takes five samples and checks
the attack pattern by using the threshold parameters, which
indicates the length of the MP phases; if there is no match
between the vPMC and the attack thresholds, the loop
resets vPMC and continues checking. If, on the other hand,
the vPMC values and the threshold match, this is the
process that is causing the attack and the PMC counters
are immediately reset to -1 to force a PMC overflow using
the current process core. Recall, PMC interrupt is enabled,
The PMC counter overflow causes the OS to suspend the
current process assigned to the current processor core and
hands control to the Trapping interrupt handler. Inside the
Trapping interrupt handler, information about the suspended
processor core is taken from the Processor Control Block
(PCB) and passed back to PIA, which will now have the
identity of the malicious process and can take necessary
action to find its owner.
5.2. Identification model Evaluation
This section discusses and evaluates the results obtained
from the experiments. To evaluate the identification, three
experiments are conducted in which the only difference is
the profiling settings. What is changed is the number of
samples {5, 10, 20} taken by the trapping task. The number
of samples is critical to identification, because more than
the threshold causes the identification model to miss the
attacker; or less than the threshold for the identification
model leads to the generation of False Negative due to
inferring non-attack samples.
Figure 6 shows profiling with 1000 samples for each
native and cloud Flush+Reload program. The duration of
Flush+Reload program jobs running in native and cloud
are different. The time quantum for the cloud-based jobs
is longer than for the native ones. This duration has an
impact on identifying the malicious process activities, which
are denoted in the red and blue horizontal lines. Green
boundaries show correct detection of the attack program by
the algorithm; red boundaries show a failure to capture the
attack program. The boundaries are not equal due to the
soft scheduler, in which there is flexibility for the jobs to
be completed. By relying on the analysis in Section 3.2,
we can define the minimum and maximum required time to
complete a job. Figure 6 shows the difference between the
quanta for native and cloud jobs. Sub-figure (a) shows the
scheduler for real-time executions in user space for a native
system. Sub-figure (b) shows the scheduler for real-time
execution of VM and host real time programs in user space.
The VM job has a larger quantum than the native-based jobs.
This is because recent work shows that the time quantum for
jobs for VM processes is longer than for jobs in a native
system for performance purposes. Thus, the identification
model has more confidence in detecting malicious VM than
a native-based malicious program.
Algorithm 1 Identification Algorithm
1: procedure IDENTIFICATION()
2: threshold, phase, counter
3: for each core: c in C do
4: obs = read(PMC)
5: if (obs satisfied thresholds) then
6: counter + +
7: if counter > phase then
8: /* ML is identified and force
9: its MP to interrupt handler */
10: modify PMC(PMC = −1)
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: end procedure
Figure 6. The execution time line is sliced among the attacker in a native
system and 4 SPEC workloads. The malicious loop inside Flush+Reload
program phases for LLC cache misses appear as chunks of samples which
can be observed as process transactions on a specific processor core.
5.3. Discussion
In this section, we have reported on experiment results
reflecting on issues which have an impact on the perfor-
mance of detection and its robustness in detecting side
channel attacks in both native and cloud systems. Regarding
robustness, the profiling mechanism is not able to recognise
the phases of the ML efficiently; instead, it is an auto
mechanism to capture the program execution attributes.
Thus, the MWA algorithm is used to extract the phases of
the ML by aggregating the samples of a phase and then
moving the entire data-set to inspect any possibilities of
attack activities in the system. So, the profiling ensures that
all the program execution activities are captured because it is
auto capturing does not rely on any means to get information
about each process . Instead, the identification mechanism is
used to acquire the identity of the attacker. Another benefit
of this approach is that the monitoring of program execution
activities for native and cloud processes use the same pro-
cess. This is because native and VM processes are executed
concurrently using the same hardware resources (e.g. CPU).
In this case, the same analysis is used for activities in both
native and cloud systems with a slight degradation in the
cloud system due to an extra translation layer in hypervisor
in cloud systems. Furthermore, the detection models can
identify more than one potential Flush+Reload attack in
the system without having any effect on detection accuracy
because multiple attacks are independently acting in the
system and they never overlap or interfere each other. Thus,
they are monitored independently.
Besides this, the identification phase relies on an inter-
rupt and the identification model is executed only if the de-
tection model detects an attack in the system. Consequently,
any mis-classification will cause interrupts. The more inter-
rupts, the more significant the performance overhead which
is generated in the system. Thus, it is essential that the
classification model be sensitive to correctly detect potential
attacks.
6. Conclusion
This paper has proposed detection of side channel at-
tacks using bagging technique. The paper also put forward
a new profiling technique to captures the program execution
attributes at core level. Thus the attacker cannot escape from
the profiling in both native and cloud system. The ROC
curve is used to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed
classifier for the detection of side channel attacks. The
classifier detects side channel attacks in both native and
cloud systems with performance of up to 99% under SPEC
CPU2006 workloads. However, the proposed method cannot
detect techniques such as Prime+Probe due to the behaviour
of the malicious loop inside the program. The future work
will be devoted to the design of a model that can detect other
side channel attacks such as Prime+Probe, Flush+Flush and
Raw-hammer.
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